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Everyone agrees that the nation confronts an urgent drug prob-
lem. But the problem wears various faces.
Most threatening is drug related violence. Daily, vicious murders
are attributed to drug feuds.' More rarely, but more frighteningly,
innocent citizens are caught in the cross fire between warring gangs,
or murdered for their opposition to drug dealing. 2 Statistics show
dramatic increases in drug related homicides in New York, Los An-
geles, Detroit, and Washington.
3
Closely related is a second face of the problem: the fear and de-
moralization spread by flagrant drug dealing. In open drug markets
where drug dealers congregate and attract unsavory users, ordinary
pedestrian traffic dries up. 4 Shopowners, who anchor these streets,
relocate or retire. City sanitation workers hurry through their work.
Teachers seek new assignments.
As neighborhoods yield to the drug culture, a third concern
arises. Local children become exposed to and then involved in drug
use, drug sales, or both. 5 While children from both middle class
and poor families are affected, the stakes for society as a whole are
particularly great when the youth Who are most threatened are
among those already most disadvantaged. 6
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Widening drug use also poses increased threats to public health
and economic productivity. It facilitates the spread of AIDS by oc-
casioning shared intravenous injections and unsafe sexual prac-
tices. 7 Inattentiveness or recklessness caused by drug induced
intoxication results in serious accidents not only on the road, but
also at work and at home.8 Even when accidents do not result, em-
ployers worry that drug use among workers lowers productivity, at a
time when American firms are struggling to compete more effec-
tively against foreign firms as yet untouched by drugs. 9
Finally, drug use, and society's response to it, help undermine key
social institutions. Families are destroyed by the disabling effects of
drugs on parents, and by the conflicts created in families of drug
using or drug dealing children. 10 Schools become less able to teach
when there is widespread drug use in the student population, and
when they are enlisted in ill-conceived efforts to institute punitive
control regimes. The criminal justice system, which has been as-
signed a prominent role in the war against drugs, may well be over-
whelmed and transformed by that effort." The crush of cases may
prove so great that it destroys what residual commitment these insti-
tutions now have to individualized justice or the hope of rehabilita-
tion. The urgency of the job may lead officials to cut corners in
investigating drug dealers. The enormous wealth created through
the drug trade may tempt public officials into corruption.
These are society's current concerns about the drug problem-
the way it is represented in newspapers, analyzed in legislative hear-
ings, and discussed in radio talk shows. Without doubt, the con-
cerns are somewhat exaggerated. More is being attributed to the
drug problem than drug use alone causes. If drug use ceased, crime
would not disappear, nor would fear, urban decay, or the AIDS epi-
demic. Some of our worst fears actually are linked more closely to
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efforts to control drugs than to drug use per se.' 2 Still, these alarm-
ing manifestations signal an important increase in levels of drug use,
and suggest that drug use and efforts to control it are producing
significant adverse social consequences. The world of drug use has
changed over the last fifteen years, and it has changed for the worse.
In this Article, I note that the "drug problem" is primarily a co-
caine epidemic, and suggest what we might learn from this fact. I
then examine the current legalization debate, and conclude that the
current regulatory scheme is more likely to be satisfactory than any
of the legalization options. Next I evaluate current supply and de-
mand reduction strategies. I conclude by exploring the tension be-
tween our need to mobilize to meet the epidemic in speedy fashion
and our need to learn about which policies work and which do not.
L The Epidemic of Cocaine Use
Today's drug problem is different from the one society faced in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Then, we worried about heroin ad-
diction and street crime in urban ghettos, psychedelic drugs on (and
off) university campuses, and marijuana use in the suburbs.' 3 Now
we worry about crack induced violence on city streets, and the dan-
gers of drug use on the job.
It is not so much that the old problems have disappeared. It is
simply that they have been surpassed. Marijuana and heroin use has
been fairly stable over the past decade. There have been some
movements: for example, marijuana use peaked in 1979 and then
declined, while heroin use has climbed slightly over the last peak
reached in 1974.14 But there have been no dramatic changes.
Abuse of these drugs, along with alcohol, might now be viewed as
the nation's endemic drug problems. Cocaine use, on the other
12. For an argument that virtually all of the worst aspects of the drug problem are
consequences of current control efforts, see Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The
Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1305.
13. See generally STRATEGY COUNCIL ON DRUG ABUSE, FEDERAL STRATEGY FOR DRUG
ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFIC PREVENTION-1973 6-10 (1973) (describes possible causes of
the 1960s drug epidemic).
14. The United States currently relies on four basic statistical systems to monitor
levels of drug use in the United States population: 1) NAT'tL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, THE
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES (a survey of the
general population that has been conducted every two or three years since 1972); 2) U.
MICH. INST. FOR Soc. RES., MONITORING THE FUTURE: A CONTINUING STUDY OF THE
LIFESTYLES AND VALUES OF YOUTH (a survey of graduating high school seniors that has
been conducted annually since 1975); 3) NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DATA FROM THE
DRUG ABUSE EARLY WARNING NETWORK (reports from a selected national sample of
emergency rooms and medical examiners of drug involvement by patients); 4) NAT'L
INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, CLIENT ORIENTED DATA ACQUISITION PROCESS, ANNUAL SUMMARY
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hand, has increased dramatically-by more than a factor of ten over
the last decade.' 5 These statistics make it evident that the United
States is not experiencing the growth of a generalized "drug prob-
lem." What gives the drug problem urgency today is a far more
specific event: the United States is beset by a serious epidemic of
cocaine use, including crack.
To a surprising degree, the cocaine epidemic crept up on us. Its
first indications probably were reports by enforcement agents in the
mid-19 7 0s that they were encountering determined, violent cocaine
traffickers from South and Central America. 16 Shortly thereafter,
reported levels of cocaine use began to rise in household surveys
used to gauge drug abuse trends. 17 Newspaper articles began to ap-
pear describing cocaine use by entertainers, sports figures and other
celebrities.
These indicators should have set off alarm bells. But other indica-
tors were not so discouraging. Until the early 1980s, the systems
that monitored the adverse consequences of drug use (e.g. deaths,
visits to emergency rooms, entrances into treatment programs, and
arrests for street crimes) did not reveal a substantial cocaine prob-
lem.' 8 The price of cocaine remained high-well out of reach for
REPORT (reports from federally supported treatment programs regarding new clients
admitted to treatment).
Each system has weaknesses as an accurate indicator of levels of drug use in the gen-
eral population; thus, they are often used in conjunction with each other. One should
keep in mind that descriptions of drug use levels in the general population are based on
interpretations of these data-they cannot simply be read. I rely on an interpretation
produced by David Boyum, who constructed indices of drug use levels based on combi-
nations of data from the population surveys, the emergency room reports, and the fed-
eral treatment program reports.
These indices suggest that marijuana use peaked in 1979 and then declined; heroin
use reached an epidemic high in 1975, then declined precipitously until 1978, then in-
creased gradually to end slightly higher than the epidemic level in 1987; cocaine use
rose slowly from a small base from 1974 to 1982, and then increased dramatically from
1982 to 1987 with the fastest growth occurring from 1985 to 1986. D. Boyum, A Second
Look at Supply Reduction Effectiveness: New Methods and Applications 15-17 (June,
1989) (Working Paper No. 89-01-17, Program in Clinical Justice Policy and Manage-
ment, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University).
For a simpler account of trends in drug use, see NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NA-
TIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: SUMMARY OF SELECTED FINDINGS-1982
(1983).
15. D. Boyum, supra note 14, at 16.
16. This is based on personal experience. I was then the Chief Planning Officer of
the United States Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration.
17. Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Highlights-1985 National Household Survey on
Drug Abuse 2 (Press Release, 1986).
18. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DAWN SEMIANNUAL REPORT TREND DATA (Statis-
tical Series G, No. 17, 1986).
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casual use by poor urbanites or teenagers.' 9 Cocaine use seemed to
be confined to America's upper and middle classes.
Suddenly, in the early 1980s, the cocaine problem mushroomed.
The epidemic spread from upper and middle classes to the lower
classes. 20 The indicators that registered the adverse social conse-
quences of cocaine use began to escalate rapidly.
2 1
In retrospect, the indicators probably were reflecting two distinct
trends. Upper and middle class users who had begun using cocaine
in the late 1970s had by 1983 become dependent on it, and had
been involved with cocaine long enough for its financial and social
demands to have depleted their economic and social capital. Bank
accounts had been emptied, the tolerance of employers exhausted,
and the support of family and friends withdrawn. For the first time,
the troubles of upper and middle class users registered not only in
intimate private circles, but in public institutions and thus national
statistics.
At the same time, cocaine moved into poorer neighborhoods,
where the publicly visible effects of cocaine use appeared much
more quickly. The financial, psychological, and social demands of
cocaine use collapsed the fragile supports of poor families, and the
consequences spilled out into public institutions. The combined ef-
fect was to thrust the disastrous consequences of cocaine use into
the public record and social consciousness.
Shortly thereafter, crack appeared. 2 2 This cheap form of cocaine
facilitated cocaine's spread to poorer and younger consumers. This,
19. See D. Boyum, supra note 14, at 6, 16.
20. Interestingly, I believe this is the first drug epidemic thought to have spread this
way. Other drug epidemics that have crossed class boundaries have moved up the socio-
economic ladder rather than down it.
21. Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Use and Consequences of Cocaine: Trends in Past
Year and Past Month Use of Cocaine by Age Category, 1972-1985 (Press Release, Octo-
ber 1986). See also NAT'L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE, DAWN SEMIANNUAL REPORT TREND DATA
(Statistical Series G, No. 23, 1989); NAT'L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE, DAWN SEMIANNUAL
REPORT TREND DATA (Statistical Series G, No. 17, 1986).
22. It is difficult to date the appearance of "crack" as a commonly abused drug. The
difficulty is conceptual as well as empirical. The conceptual problem is that smokeable
crack has always been present to some degree among the population of cocaine users-
it is therefore not clear how we should define "commonly abused." Empirically, it is
difficult to get accurate information about when crack abuse crossed this conceptual
threshold. It appears that by the summer of 1985 it had become recognized nationally.
By the late fall of 1985, crack was apparently being commonly produced and consumed
in the United States. Personal Communication with Nicholas Kozell, Chief of the Epide-
miology Branch, Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse (Jan. 19, 1990).
For a description of the impact of crack on the inner cities, see Johnson, Williams, Dei
& Sanabria, Drug Abuse in the Inner City: Impact on Hard Drug Users and the Community, in
DRUGS AND CRIME (M. Tonry & J. Wilson, eds.) (forthcoming) (Crime and Justice: An
Annual Review of the Research, vol. 13, 1990).
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in turn, created new marketing opportunities that led to conflicts
among those competing to exploit them. Because the cocaine mar-
kets were on city streets rather than in hotels or houses, dealer vio-
lence spilled over to the general population.
In short, it is cocaine and crack rather than heroin, marijuana and
hallucinogens that are now shaping both our conception and the
underlying reality of the drug problem. Our long-standing con-
cerns about drug related crime have changed: drug related crime in
the 1970s was mostly restricted to robberies and burglaries commit-
ted by heroin junkies desperate for a fix, but now it includes street
violence committed by warring cocaine-dealing gangs. Similarly, we
have long worried that drugs could trap our children, but the availa-
bility and low price of crack now make this an even more serious
threat. But for cocaine, the drug problem might have remained
what it had previously been.
Understanding that we are dealing with a cocaine epidemic makes
it somewhat easier to analyze future prospects for growth or control
of the problem. As David Musto reminds us, this is only the most
recent cocaine epidemic the country has faced. We endured a previ-
ous cocaine epidemic around the turn of the century.23 That experi-
ence provides a benchmark we might use to set expectations for the
future.
The last epidemic also was widespread. Indeed, cocaine was
greeted warmly and enthusiastically, and prescribed for curing many
ills, including addiction to opiates. At the outset, few adverse con-
sequences of the growing consumption of cocaine appeared. It was
not until about a decade into the epidemic that hints of bad effects
began to appear. Careers of prominent people were ruined. The
drug began to be linked to crime. As the negative consequences
emerged, society's attitudes toward cocaine began to change. As a
result, cocaine use began to decline, and public policies regulating
drugs became more restrictive and penalties for violation became
harsher. Society eventually learned that cocaine was dangerous, and
its use gradually declined.
Unfortunately, as society's experience with cocaine receded into
the distant past, the institutionalized opposition to cocaine use be-
came more abstract. Opposition was no longer fueled by hard per-
sonal experience. Society became ready, once again, to be tempted
by the appeal of what is initially an attractive drug.
23. Musto, America's First Cocaine Epidemic, 13 WILSON Q., Summer 1989, at 59-64.
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In some respect, the last epidemic gives us reason to be optimis-
tic. It indicates that society eventually learns through its collective
experience that cocaine is dangerous, and this leads to decreased
use. The problems, however, with viewing society's last bout with
cocaine as a success story are first, that too many casualties resulted
from the epidemic before society learned about the problem, and
second, that the public policy measures at the end of the epidemic
probably were harsher than they needed to be given that society was
learning its lesson the hard way.
There are limits to analogizing the current epidemic to the last
one. Features of today's society make it likely that the casualties
taken in the upswing of the epidemic may be greater than they were
at the turn of the century. By all accounts, crack appears to be a
more dangerous drug than powder cocaine. 24 Society as a whole, or
in pockets, may be more vulnerable to drug addiction than was
American society at the end of the century. AIDS is a far greater
threat to drug users than previous diseases spread through drug
epidemics.
On the other hand, there are some signs that the scenario is re-
peating itself. Middle class cocaine use seems to be diminishing.
25
Attitudes toward cocaine use are becoming more hostile. 26 Use may
very well be declining-at least among society's better off.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the past is
that cocaine use is epidemic in society rather than endemic; a sharp
increase in use probably will be followed by a sharp decrease. As we
wait for society to again learn through hard experience that this
drug-cocaine-is a bad one, however, we can make long-term
gains by acting aggressively now to stem the reach of the cocaine
epidemic. This is the battle we must fight now.
II. Drugs and the Law
A cornerstone of America's drug policy is the law that prohibits
the use of some psychoactive drugs and regulates the use of others.
Recently, an old debate about whether it is wise social policy to reg-
ulate the use of drugs has been re-opened. 27 The issue is whether
24. Verebey & Gold, From Coca Leaves to Crack: The Effects of Dose and Routes of Adminis-
tration in Abuse Liability, 18 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 513 (1988).
25. See Rich Versus Poor: Drug Patterns are Diverging, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1987, at Al,
col. 2.
26. See generally The Media-Advertising Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Chang-
ing Attitudes Towards Drug Use (1988) [hereinafter Changing Attitudes].
27. See generally Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, 92 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1988).
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those psychoactive drugs now legally proscribed, such as heroin,
marijuana, and hallucinogens, should be "legalized" in the interests
of ending moralistic state paternalism, reducing the criminal vio-
lence associated with black markets and criminalized users, and en-
couraging the development of informal social controls to keep drug
use within safe bounds.
A. Analyzing Legalization Options
The legalization debate really proceeds at two different levels of
analysis. One level focuses on the justice or propriety of using the
power of the criminal law to control what is arguably a personal de-
cision to "choose one's own road to hell." The other level focuses
on the practical effect of legalization on important social objectives
such as minimizing crime and promoting the welfare of the
population.
The first level of analysis is an exercise in political philosophy.
Indeed, much of the force of the argument for legalization comes
from the sense that it is morally improper-or at least illiberal-for
the state to impose its view of personal virtue on the citizenry. It is
particularly inappropriate to do this with the moralistic fervor that is
associated with the passage and enforcement of criminal laws. Thus
it is wrong in principle for the state to criminalize drug use. This
position is little affected by arguments about the societal effects of
such laws.
The second level of analysis is more empirical and consequential-
ist; it is concerned with the effects of prohibition or legalization on
society. To engage in the second level of analysis, it is necessary to
take three distinct analytic steps.
1. Imagining alternatives. The first step is to specify the na-
ture of the legal regime that is to be substituted for the current one.
There are, after all, many possibilities. They include:
1) "total legalization," under which all restrictions on the production,
sale, and use of the drugs would be eliminated;
2) "legal for all except minors," under which dealers would be pro-
hibited from selling to minors, and minors would be prohibited from
purchasing or using specified drugs, on pain of minor civil penalties
for violations;
3) "legal under medical prescription," under which distributors would
be allowed to sell only to those who had medical prescriptions, and
only those with medical prescriptions would be allowed to possess and
use specified drugs;
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4) "legal under limited medical prescription," under which physicians
would be authorized to prescribe specific drugs only for a limited
number of medical indications;
5) "legal under the supervision of governmental clinics," under which
the government would assume monopolistic responsibility for distrib-
uting the drugs through government-sponsored clinics, and only those
enrolled in the clinics would be allowed to possess or use the drugs; or
6) "decriminalization of use," under which the production and distri-
bution of the drugs would remain illegal, but criminal penalties for
possession and use would be eliminated.
While all these regimes might be considered "legalization" regimes,
they differ sufficiently in terms of their operations and likely social
consequences that we must be careful to identify which particular
form of legalization we are considering before making predictions
about the likely social outcomes of "legalizing drugs." 28 Otherwise,
the analysis becomes distorted.
For example, in estimating the impact of "legalization" on the
size and nature of the black market in drugs, and on the level of
drug use, it matters enormously whether one is discussing the most
liberal legalization regimes (i.e. those toward the top of the list
presented above) or the more restrictive forms of legalization (such
as those toward the bottom of the list). Only the most liberal legal
regimes can be expected to eliminate the black market entirely, and
these are the ones that have the greatest potential for leading to
dramatic increases in levels of use. The more limited legalization
regimes provide some protection against the threat of explosive in-
creases in narcotics use fueled by newly created legitimate markets,
but only at the price of maintaining conditions that are favorable to
a continuation of the black market.
2. Estimating probabilities of consequence. The second analytic
step is to predict how adopting one of these legalization regimes
would affect the social dimensions of the drug problem. In general,
these predictions cannot be precise "point estimates"-for example,
one cannot responsibly say that violent crime would be reduced by
ten percent over current levels by adopting a given regime. There is
simply not enough empirical evidence or actual experience with pre-
vious epidemics to justify such precise predictions. At best, one can
estimate the likely directions and magnitudes of the changes that
would occur under a particular legalization regime for each of the
28. See generally Kleiman & Saiger, Drug Legalization: The Importance of Asking the Right
Question (forthcoming in HOFSTRA L. REV.).
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relevant dimensions of the problem (e.g., crime, neighborhood de-
cay, effect on children, public health and safety, and the proper
functioning of major social institutions). Even these broad esti-
mates must be regarded only as the most likely ones.29
For example, in estimating the impact of legalization on future
levels of drug use, one can tell a plausible story that consumption
would decrease under a legalization regime because, for instance,
the profit motive now animating illegal drug dealers to recruit new
users would weaken,30 and some of the allure associated with "for-
bidden fruit" would disappear. But one can also envision that
under the same legalization regime consumption would increase,
perhaps even dramatically: drugs would become cheaper and more
widely available across broader elements of the society, thereby
making drug use more convenient; the stigma associated with drug
use would disappear, thereby encouraging more common use; and
legitimate suppliers would have as much reason to encourage wider
drug use as the illegal dealers.
Similarly, one can point to evidence that indicates that tight legal
restrictions on drugs have been ineffective. In countries such as Sin-
gapore even the most stringent regimes have failed to eliminate
drug use, 3' and drug use in the United States has increased despite
the existence of the current legal regime.3 2 But one can also point
to evidence indicating that tightening controls has succeeded in re-
ducing drug consumption: when England restricted the prescription
of heroin to a small number of physicians in 1968, the rate at which
new addicts appeared in England diminished;33 and when the
United States succeeded in breaking up the traffic in heroin from
Turkey and France in the early 1970s, creating a heroin shortage on
the east coast, the rate at which people began using heroin slowed. 34
Faced with such divergent reasoning and evidence, one cannot be
certain about the impact of legalization on levels of drug use. Un-
certainty, however, is not the same as ignorance. Some outcomes
are more probable than others. We should let the weight of our
observations shift our sense of what is more or less likely in one
29. For an analytic framework for making decisions under uncertainty, see H.
RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968).
30. Nadelmann, supra note 27, at 23-24.
31. D. Lipton, Drug Control Abroad (Spring 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author).
32. Nadelmann, supra note 27, at 3.
33. See H. JUDSON, HEROIN ADDICTION IN BRITAIN: WHAT AMERICANS CAN LEARN
FROM THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE 63-64 (1974).
34. See Statement ofJohn R. Bartels and Dr. Robert L. DuPont before the Subcom-
mittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development, House Committee on For-
eign Affairs (April 23, 1975).
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direction or another.3 5 What makes one estimate better than an-
other is that it is more consistent with what is really known about the
problem. Often that means that the good estimates include a wide
range of possibilities.
In addition, in calculating the consequences of legalization one
must recognize that a shift in the legal regime could produce unan-
ticipated consequences in areas outside the current focus of consid-
eration. For example, it is possible that any of the legalization
strategies would undermine the effectiveness of many current treat-
ment programs that seem to depend in part for their effectiveness
on legal compulsion and difficult conditions in drug markets.3 6 Per-
haps a legalization regime would be good for most of the nation's
communities but have particularly bad consequences for the na-
tion's poorest communities. Or, perhaps a legalization policy would
salvage the criminal justice system but break the back of the nation's
medical and educational institutions. Obviously, one cannot antici-
pate or calculate every consequence. The point is that one must
guard against the tendency to analyze the strengths of a given policy
in dealing with only a few aspects of today's problem, while ignoring
the proposed policy's weaknesses in dealing with the new problems
once the legalization policy has been introduced.
3. Valuing uncertain consequences. The third analytic step is to
consider what social values we most want to advance through drug
policy. It is unlikely that a legalization strategy would be better than
the current regulatory strategy for all relevant social concerns. In
all likelihood, a legalization strategy would be better in some areas
of performance, and worse in others. 37 For example, legalization
might reduce criminal violence, but at the expense of reducing the
health and social functioning of drug users and their children. Simi-
larly, though legalization might reduce the state's reliance on coer-
cion to achieve its purposes, and protect the criminal justice system
from corruption, it might also increase public expenditures for
treatment and prevention, and produce unfortunate results for the
schools and medical institutions forced to contend with more wide-
spread drug use. Which of these worlds one prefers is a matter of
values as well as estimated consequences.
35. H. RAIFFA, supra note 29.
36. See Special Issue: A Social Policy Analysis of Compulsory Treatment for Opiate Dependence,
18J. DRUG ISSUES 1 (1988).
37. For a discussion of the role of values in policy analysis, see Moore, Social Science
and Policy Analysis: Some Fundamental Differences, in ETHICS, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND POL-
iCY ANALYSIS 271-91 (1983).
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A complete analysis of the legalization question is beyond the
scope of this paper. Before leaving the subject, however, it is worth
casting some doubt on the optimistic predictions of those who favor
legalization.
B. The Current Legal Regime. Moral Prohibition or Rational Regulation?
One of the most frustrating aspects of the current debate about
legalization is that the debaters often seem ignorant about the cur-
rent legal regime. The system of laws regulating drug use is often
painted as moralistic and paternalistic rather than as a rational
scheme for regulating the uses of psychoactive drugs. 38 It is true
that much of the spirit of drug policy could be characterized as mor-
alistic and paternalistic. It is also true that there are some important
prohibitionist features of the current law. There are some drugs,
for example, whose use is entirely prohibited in the United States.
In addition, there are severe criminal penalties attached to illegal
trafficking and use.
Still, the actual federal statute controlling the production, distri-
bution and use of psychoactive drugs in the United States owes
much to the spirit of regulation. It does not seek to eliminate all
psychoactive drugs from society; it seeks to strike a reasonable bal-
ance between society's worries about the potential for drug abuse,
and its interest in being able to use the drugs for legitimate medical
purposes.
The federal statute pursues these aims by establishing five levels
of controls on drugs.3 9 The most stringent level-Schedule I---is
reserved for drugs that have no recognized legitimate medical uses.
Heroin, marijuana, LSD, and other psychedelic drugs are included
in Schedule I. Schedules II through V are used for drugs that have
legitimate medical uses, but also some potential for abuse. The
higher the estimated potential for abuse, the higher the schedule,
and the more extensive the controls that are placed on the drug.
Cocaine, for example, is in Schedule II. It is legally manufactured
and distributed in the United States as a topical anesthesia. In this
sense, cocaine already is legalized, though it is very tightly regu-
lated. Production is restricted to the amount estimated to be neces-
sary to meet the very limited demand for its specialized medical
38. See generally Wisotsky, supra note 12.
39. For a general description of the Controlled Substances Act, see Quinn & Mc-
Laughlin, The Evolution of Federal Drug Control Legzslation, 1972-73 DRUG ABUSE L. REV.
144-85.
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uses. Only licensed physicians distribute it, and only to patients
with well-established needs. Manufacturers, drugstores, physicians,
and patients are all subjected to close governmental scrutiny.
Benzodiazepams, such as Valium, are in Schedule IV. This re-
flects the view that these drugs are less vulnerable to abuse than
cocaine and that they have far wider medical applications. These
drugs may be producedand distributed only by those licensed to do
so, but the restrictions are less strict than those regulating cocaine:
there are no manufacturing quotas, no special requirements that
vendors keep the drugs in safes to guard against theft, and slightly
looser record-keeping requirements.
The logical coherence and operational administration of this reg-
ulatory scheme can be attacked on several fronts. First, neither al-
cohol nor tobacco-two of the most widely used and abused drugs
in the society-are included within its scope. Second, the schedules
do not give weight to the recreational uses of drugs-regardless of
how harmless the drugs might be. Only psychoactive drugs with ap-
proved medical uses can be used in the society, and only for those
approved uses. Third, the methods used to estimate the abuse po-
tential of drugs are flawed, and government decisions are often in-
fluenced by commercial manufacturers of psychoactive drugs with
legitimate medical uses 40 Still, despite its weaknesses, this statute is
an honest piece of legislation that simultaneously expresses our so-
ciety's deep concerns about the potential hazards of psychoactive
drugs and its desire to harness the medical benefits they can pro-
duce. It provides a coherent framework within which to regulate
psychoactive drugs.
C. Legalization and Drug Related Criminal Violence
The confidence with which proponents of legalization predict
large reductions in criminal violence as a consequence of some form
of legalization strategy is unwarranted, and is based on a misconcep-
tion of the connection between drug distribution, drug use, and
40. For a description and critical evaluation of these methods, see M. FISCHMAN & N.
MELLO, TESTING FOR ABUSE LIABILITY OF DRUGS IN HUMANS, (Nat'l Inst. of Drug Abuse
Research Monograph No. 92, 1989).
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criminal violence.4 1 In analyzing the impact of legalization on crimi-
nal violence, we must distinguish between the violence associated
with illegal trafficking, and the violence associated with drug use.
4 2
Advocates of legalization may be correct that violence associated
with illegal trafficking would decrease under a legalization regime.
Creating a legitimate sector of drug production, distribution and
use would weaken the illegal distribution system by creating an al-
ternative source of supply for drug users.4 3 To the extent that legal
competition would drive illegal dealers out of business, and to the
extent that the illegal drug business constitutes the only motivation
and economic outlet for the criminal violence of the dealers, legali-
zation would reduce the criminal violence associated with drug traf-
ficking. It might also be true that once illegal dealers lost their
powerful economic position as the sole source of drugs and as the
principal creators of wealth in some communities, these dealers
would become much easier to identify and arrest. The community
would no longer be dependent on them for drugs and money. Both
effects would tend to reduce criminal violence.
But there are reasons to be worried that the pacifying effect of
legalization would be smaller than many anticipate. Only the most
liberal legalization regime, complete legalization, would entirely
eliminate the black market in drugs. The other regimes create con-
ditions for black markets to arise precisely because they impose re-
strictions on use.4 4 Granted, the markets that arise to meet the
demand that lies outside the legally tolerated uses might be less vio-
lent than those that now exist. After all, depending on the legaliza-
tion regime adopted, drugs might be supplied by small scale
diversion from legal markets, rather than by international criminal
cartels. 4 5 But one should not be too sanguine about this prospect.
41. For a detailed exploration of these relationships, see Fagan, Intoxication and Ag-
gression; Chaiken & Chaiken, Drugs and Predatory Crime; and Hunt, Drugs and Consensual
Crime: Drug Dealing and Prostitution, each in DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 22.
42. This is easy to do conceptually, but difficult to do empirically. For a successful
effort at making this distinction, and for showing that the distinction matters, see Gold-
stein, Brownstein, Ryan & Bellucci, Crack and Homicide in New York City, 1988: A Concep-
tually-Based Event Analysis, in CONTEMP. DRUG PROBLEMS (forthcoming) [hereinafter
Goldstein].
43. Moore, Supply Reduction and Drug Law Enforcement, in DRUGS AND CRIME, supra
note 22.
44. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION 277-82 (1968).
45. Moore, Drug Policy and Organized Crime, in AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG ABUSE, DRUG
TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME, Appendix G at 49-54 (1986).
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The black market in amphetamines-a legalized but stringently reg-
ulated drug-has involved violent motorcycle gangs as well as pa-
tients who divert their prescribed drugs to others.46 When a
profitable undertaking lies outside the law, it always seems to attract
some level of violence.
Similarly, it is by no means clear that people with a talent for vio-
lence will stop using that talent for economic gains simply because
one important opportunity disappears. The Mafia has shown that
organizations with a capacity for sustained and disciplined violence
can make a great deal of money from enterprises such as extortion,
labor racketeering, loan sharking, and gambling as well as drugs. 47
No small amount of violence is associated with struggles over the
control and conduct of these enterprises. 48 Consequently, there is
little reason to believe that today's drug gangs, now schooled in vio-
lence, will fade away, any more than there was reason to believe that
the gangs that arose during Prohibition would fade away once Pro-
hibition ended.
It may also be that the portion of criminal violence attributable to
drug trafficking is smaller than it now appears to be.49 The defini-
tion of a "drug related killing" is sufficiently loose that one cannot
be sure that the apparent increase in drug related homicide has not
been inflated by attributing more homicides to this category than
would have been attributed several years ago. 50 If this were true,
then the elimination of drug related homicides would be less impor-
tant than one might now assume. All these caveats make one less
confident that legalization strategies would produce a marked and
significant reduction in violent crimes associated with drug
trafficking.
The prediction that legalization would reduce significantly violent
crimes committed by drug users is even shakier. This prediction is
based heavily on the idea that drug users commit crimes to earn
46. Off. of Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Admin., Project Crystal City: A Survey of
Methamphetamine Trafficking and Abuse in the United States 21-22 (1989).
47. See Schelling, What ls the Business of Organized Crime?, 20J. OF PUB. L. 73-75 (1971);
see generally P. REUTER, DISORGANIZED CRIME: THE ECONOMICS OF THE VISIBLE HAND
(1983).
48. For a recent discussion of the role of violence in illegal drug markets, see M.
KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA: COSTS OF ABUSE, COSTS OF CONTROL 122-33 (1989).
49. See Goldstein, supra note 42, at 22.
50. For a methodological discussion of the problems in producing and applying an
operational definition of drug related homicide, see Goldstein, Drugs and IViolent Crime, in
PATHWAYS TO CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 16-24 (1989).
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money to pay for their habits. 5' In legalized markets, the argument
goes, drugs would be cheaper so crime would decrease. If users do
not commit crimes exclusively to pay for their habits, however, it is
less clear that legalization would control crime.
If, for example, drug users commit crimes because criminal enter-
prise represents the best way that they know to get money, and if
users would spend more on other commodities if they spent less on
drugs because legalization made them cheaper, there is no reason to
predict that legalization would reduce drug user crime. Or, if what
links drugs to crime are physiological states caused by drug use that
either stimulate excitability or aggression or dull the psychological
inhibitions to violence, then crime by users will vary according to
consumption and not price. Any increased level of drug consump-
tion associated with legalization actually would produce an increase,
rather than a decrease, in drug-related crime.52
The first possibility is supported empirically by evidence indicat-
ing that criminal activity often precedes drug use, and is sustained
even after drug use declines. 53 The second argument seems implau-
sible when discussing heroin, but more likely when considering co-
caine. 54 Moreover, alcohol's close relationship to violent crime
reminds us that mere intoxication can be strongly associated with
violence. 55
Again, these observations do not prove that legalization would fail
to reduce crime; they simply decrease one's estimate of the likeli-
hood that crime would decrease. There is a real possibility that le-
galization will not produce a large reduction in crime.
51. See DRUG USE AND CRIME: REPORT OF THE PANEL ON DRUG USE AND CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR 3 (1976).
52. For a discussion of these possibilities, see Fagan, Intoxication and Aggression, in
DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 22.
53. See Nurco, Hanlon, Kinlock & Duszynski, Differential Criminal Patterns of Narcotic
Addicts over an Addiction Career, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 418 (1988).
54. Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Cocaine Use in America, PREVENTION NETWORKS, Apr.
1986, at 6-8; NAT'L COMM. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, INJURY PREVENTION:
MEETING THE CHALLENGE 206, 226 (1989).
55. Collins, Alcohol Use and Criminal Behavior. An Empirical, Theoretical, and Methodologi-
cal Overview, in DRINKING AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AL-
COHOL CONSUMPTION AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1981). For another discussion of this
relationship, see Gerstein, Alcohol Use and Consequences, in PANEL ON ALTERNATIVE POLI-
CIES AFFECTING THE PREVENTION OF ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, ALCOHOL AND
PUBLIC POLICY: BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION 203-07, 216-17 (1981) [hereinafter
ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY].
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D. Legalization and Levels of Drug Use and Abuse
The most optimistic predictions made by proponents of legaliza-
tion are first, that drug use would not increase significantly as a re-
sult of legalization, and second, that even if drug use increased, the
social consequences would not be as severe as those we now face,
because drugs would be available in more benign forms, and infor-
mal social controls would arise to minimize drug abuse.
The prediction that drug consumption would remain constant or
decline under a legalization regime seems to be based on one of
three hypotheses. The first is that only the illicitness of drugs makes
them attractive to potential users. If the profit motive for illegal
dealers were taken away, and the "forbidden fruit" aspect of drugs
eliminated, drugs would lose their appeal.
56
A second theory is that the demand for drugs is perfectly inelastic.
There are some people who are predisposed to use drugs who can-
not be discouraged from using drugs by price or inconvenience.
Others would not be tempted into use by ready access and social
acceptability. Under this theory, legalizing drugs would not result
in increased use.
The third hypothesis is that people learn from experience which
drugs are safe and which are not. Once it becomes clear that some
drugs are dangerous, people would voluntarily choose not to use
them. In this view, the laws give only redundant protection once
society has learned about the different drugs.
57
There is relatively little evidence to support any of these hypothe-
ses, and, in some cases, the reasoning is quite flawed. The claim
that illicitness alone makes drug dealers aggressive marketeers is al-
most certainly wrong-at least as a general proposition. We know
from empirical studies that drug users are rarely recruited into drug
use by drug dealers. 58 Indeed, new drug users are among the most
dangerous consumers for illegal dealers to recruit. 59 Instead, neo-
phytes are recruited by drug using peers who are themselves just
56. Nadelmann, supra note 27, at 12.
57. See generally Maloff, Becker, Fonaroff & Rodin, Informal Social Controls and Their
Influence on Substance Use, in CONTROL OVER INTOXICANT USE: PHARMACOLOGICAL, PSY-
CHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 53-76 (1982) (informal controls, as opposed
to formal mechanisms, may be more effective policy alternatives for controlling sub-
stance use and addiction).
58. See Simons, Conger & Whitbeck, A Multistage Social Learning Model of the Influences
of Family and Peers Upon Adolescent Substance Abuse, 18J. DRUG ISSUES 293-315 (1988)
59. M. MOORE, BuY AND BUST 18-19 (1977).
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starting drug use and show few of the negative consequences of
drug use.
60
Illicitness may increase the appeal of drugs for some potential
users who seek "forbidden fruit," but it may well discourage others.
Further, it is only the most liberal form of legalization that elimi-
nates the illicit aspect for children and teenagers. And it would be
hard in any case to make drug use seem boring and conventional.
Drug use is inherently risky and precocious behavior, regardless of
its legal status, and thus inevitably appeals to some teenagers.
One must also acknowledge that while legalization weakens the
black market in drugs, it establishes a legitimate market that has
some of the same internal incentives for expansion as the illegal
one. Our experience with legalizing alcohol and gambling shows
that legitimated vice industries have a zeal for profits and market
development. Remarkably, these motives remain strong even when,
as in the case of gambling, the enterprises are run by
governments .61
The second claim, that there is a fixed number of drug users in
society, flies in the face of both common sense and experience. Af-
ter all, societal drug use has not remained constant. Cocaine use
has increased dramatically in the past decade. 62 This increase has
not been associated with a corresponding decline in alcohol use
among similar age cohorts.63 There is thus no reason to believe that
the demand for drugs is invariant in society.
In fact, experience tells us the opposite: behavior is influenced by
opportunities. If the opportunities for drug use are distributed
more widely through the population, with less stigma associated
with use, more people will exploit the opportunity. It should not
60. Simons, Conger & Whitbeck, supra note 58.
61. For a discussion of government controlled gambling, see C. CLOTFELTER & P.
COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTrERIES IN AMERICA (1989).
62. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, EPIDEMIOLOGIC TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE I-I (1989).
63. Surveys conducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse over the past decade
indicate a constant level of alcohol use by American citizens; it is neither increasing nor
decreasing. See O'Malley, Bachman & Johnston, Period, Age, and Cohort Effects on Substance
Abuse Among American Youth, 1976-1982, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 682-88 (1984) (alcohol
use by young adults age 18-25 and adults over age 25 remained stable in survey years
1979, 1982 and 1985). On the other hand, these surveys also indicate a distinct upward
trend in cocaine use by American citizens in general. Id. Obviously, this indicates an
increase in drug demand in this society. If the idea that drug demand remains constant
were true, we would have to see alcohol users "switching" to cocaine, and therefore a
decrease in alcohol use, in order to account for the rising numbers of cocaine users.
The idea that cocaine is somehow "replacing" alcohol as the drug of preference is sim-
ply not true. The simple fact is that the demand for drugs and the absolute number of
drug users are rising.
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seem surprising that the most widely used psychoactive substances
are tobacco and alcohol-drugs that are now legal. Moreover, it
seems fairly clear that reducing access to drugs has an impact on
levels of consumption: when alcohol was prohibited, alcohol con-
sumption fell by a third;' 4 when states have raised taxes on alcohol,
alcohol consumption has fallen, apparently even among chronic al-
coholics; 65 when England restricted the prescription of heroin to a
small number of government supervised physicians in 1968, the rate
at which new heroin addicts appeared in England slowed; 66 when
Vietnam veterans who used drugs heavily in Vietnam under condi-
tions of ready availability returned to the United States, where drugs
were less readily available, many abandoned their use;6 7 and when
cocaine traffickers arrived in the United States with tons of cocaine,
an epidemic of cocaine use was launched.
Such observations do not "prove" that levels of drug use would
increase if drugs were legalized, but they certainly influence the bet-
ting odds. The bet that drug consumption would decrease seems
like a long shot. The bet that drug consumption would increase
seems surer. One would even have to put reasonable odds on the
chance that drug use would increase significantly.
Probably the shakiest prediction made by advocates of legaliza-
tion is the third prediction: that informal controls would arise,
rooted in personal experience, which then would guide individual
users in the proper use of drugs and would shield the population as
a whole from dramatic increases in levels of drug use and/or its ad-
verse consequences. This prediction is based principally on a hope-
ful analogy to what now is occurring with respect to smoking. 68
To some extent, this prediction seems plausible. If drugs were
legal, one would see many more people using drugs in controlled
and successful ways than one now sees under the current legal re-
gime. Drug users in a legal regime would be psychologically and
sociologically different-generally sturdier-than those who use
64. See generally N. CLARK, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
PROHIBITION 146-47 (1976).
65. See Cook, The Effect of Liquor Taxes on Drinking, Cirrhosis, and Auto Accidents, in ALCO-
HOL AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 55, at 256.
66. H. JUDSON, supra note 33, at 64.
67. L. ROBBINS, THE VIETNAM DRUG USER RETURNS 78-79 (Special Action Office for
Drug Abuse Prevention Monograph Series A, No. 2, 1973).
68. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE SUR-




drugs under a prohibitionist regime, and informal controls would,
in fact, arise to give them guidance about safe drug use.
While the proportion of drug users who are in trouble with a drug
would diminish as a fraction of all drug users, however, the absolute
number of users in trouble would increase because the total number
of users probably would have increased. Moreover, even those who
use drugs relatively safely have accidents. And while the probability
of such accidents may be low, due to the fact that they are using
drugs safely, the absolute burden on the society would be large be-
cause there would be more people now using drugs.
In sketching these possibilities, I am drawing heavily on an anal-
ogy with alcohol. 69 Society now exhibits a very broad distribution of
drinking practices. Many of these practices are reasonably safe in
the sense that they are unlikely to produce a crime, an accident, or a
collapse of a social institution. Because there is a great deal of "safe
drinking," one might say that society's informal social controls are
working well.
On the other hand, a small fraction but a huge absolute number
of people are in serious trouble with alcohol-a number that dwarfs
our estimates of the number in serious trouble with drugs. 70 More-
over, a significant portion of what society views as the alcohol prob-
lem-namely, traffic accidents, domestic fights, even lost jobs-is
generated by the large group of drinkers whose consumption pat-
terns are fairly benign, but who cannot entirely eliminate the risks
associated with being intoxicated at the wrong place and the wrong
time. 7' There is no reason to ignore this pattern in making predic-
tions about patterns of drug consumption and consequences under
a legal regime.
E. A Contingent Conclusion
In sum, I am sympathetic to the notion that society should have a
rational regulatory scheme for controlling the availability of
psychoactive drugs according to reasoned estimates of their poten-
tial for abuse and their value in legitimate medical use. I believe
that the current statutes create a workable framework for such a
regime.
69. ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 55, at 16-47.
70. Approximately ten million people are classified as problem drinkers. Gerstein,
Alcohol Use and Consequences, in ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 55, at 208. There
are less than a million daily users of heroin and cocaine, however.
71. ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 55, at 44 ("[a]lcohol problems occur
throughout the drinking population").
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In answer to the question of whether society would be better off if
it widened legitimate access to drugs such as heroin and cocaine, I
would say no. My judgment is that consumption would increase
substantially, and while that increased consumption would in many
ways look more benign than the drug use we now see, this appear-
ance would be an illusion because it would hide significant absolute
increases in the damages associated with drug use. Indeed, widen-
ing access to cocaine seems like a particularly reckless move at a
time when society is trying to cope with dramatic increases in the
use of a drug that has proven over the last decade its capacities to
attract unwary users and to inflict significant losses on American
communities.
III. Supply Versus Demand Reduction Strategies
If legalizing drugs does not solve the drug problem, what is the
alternative? The current policy debate generally focuses on the wis-
dom of relying on supply reduction versus demand reduction strate-
gies. Supply reduction strategies include crop eradication, drug
interdiction at national borders, and the immobilization of traffick-
ing networks.
Demand reduction strategies are often divided between treatment
programs designed to help experienced users abandon their drug
use and prevention programs designed to dissuade non- or novice
users from drug experimentation. Specific efforts include broadcast
media campaigns designed to alert citizens to the hazards of drug
use; counselling programs that train high risk adolescents in meth-
ods of resisting peer group pressures to experiment with drugs; and
treatment programs, therapeutic communities and methadone
maintenance programs designed to reduce users' reliance on drugs.
Each of these approaches has a certain logic. The logic of the
supply reduction strategy is simple: if drugs aren't available, people
won't use them. In addition, supply reduction strategies have the
political advantage of externalizing the problem by focusing public
hostility on popular villains.
The logic of demand reduction approaches is equally simple: so
long as people want to use drugs, someone will find it profitable to
supply them. Consequently, the only permanent solution is to re-
duce demand and the conditions that create demand. Demand side
strategies have the political advantages of focusing society's ener-




The question of which approach works best is more difficult to
answer. In recent years, we seem to have witnessed some of the
important limitations of supply side approaches to the drug prob-
lem. We have more than doubled the resources on the supply side
efforts, focused them increasingly on cocaine, and yet seen violence
rise as the price of cocaine has fallen to historically low levels.
72
One can argue, of course, that the situation would have been even
worse but for the heroic supply side interventions, but the argument
rings a bit hollow.
Two pieces of empirical data suggest that supply reduction efforts
can be successful in reducing the supply of drugs. First, the price of
drugs in illicit markets is much higher than the price of the same
drugs in legal markets. Heroin is sixty times more expensive than
equivalent doses of morphine; cocaine is fifteen times more expen-
sive in illicit markets than in legal markets. 73 The price elasticity of
demand for these drugs does not have to be great for such huge
price effects to significantly decrease the consumption of these
drugs.7
4
Second, an examination of the prices and quantities of drugs con-
sumed by the United States population over approximately the last
two decades reveals three periods in which supply reduction efforts
appear to have succeeded. Those were periods in which the mea-
sured price of drugs increased even as the indicators of the quantity
consumed fell. In the early 1970s, crop control efforts in Turkey
and enforcement actions against the "French Connection" pro-
duced a shortage of heroin on the East Coast. 75 In the late 1970s,
crop eradication programs in Mexico seemed to produce a nation-
wide reduction in the supply of heroin. Recently, expanded in-
terdiction efforts seem to have produced a reduction in the supply
of marijuana. These successes must be compared with a clear fail-
ure: for the last ten years, the price of cocaine has been falling as the
quantity consumed has increased.
76
Thus, it is unclear whether supply reduction efforts are contribut-
ing to the solution of the drug problem. There have been some
72. See generally Moore, Supply Reduction and Drug Law Enforcement, in DRUGS AND
CRIME, supra note 22.
73. D. Boyum, supra note 14.
74. Moore, Supply Reduction and Drug Law Enforcement, in DRUGS AND CRIME, supra
note 22 (numerical estimates of price elasticities).
75. Statement of John R. Bartels and Dr. Robert L. DuPont, supra note 34.
76. Moore, Supply Reduction and Drug Law Enforcement, in DRUGS AND CRIME, supra
note 22.
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successes, and some failures. We can only engage in informed spec-
ulation as to why some efforts succeed and some fail. Current think-
ing suggests that the important long run effects of supply reduction
efforts operate by making it extremely difficult for dealers to com-
plete risky transactions. 77 This, more than control over raw materi-
als, technology, capital, or labor, reduces the supply of drugs to
illicit markets and forces the price well above the prices for
equivalent drugs in legitimate markets.
On the demand side, we are accumulating evidence that treatment
programs do succeed in reducing drug use and improving the be-
havior and condition of many drug users who participate-at least
so long as the drug users remain in the programs. 78 Drug treatment
programs rarely produce "cures" in the sense that those treated re-
duce their drug use to zero and stay that way for the rest of their
lives. Instead, they produce reductions in drug use and criminal
conduct, and improvements in health and social functioning while
the user remains in treatment. 79 Sometimes these effects last for a
period after treatment. While such results are not necessarily cures,
they are valuable in the way that successful efforts to manage
chronic diseases are valuable: they improve the patient's quality of
life and her social functioning.
The fact that drug treatment programs produce important
changes in behavior only so long as the users remain in treatment
heightens the significance of treatment programs' capacity to retain
users. A significant finding now emerging is that legal compul-
sion-either through court diversion, formal probation, or civil
commitment-helps to retain users in treatment without losing ef-
fectiveness. 80 This finding is important not only because it suggests
ways of increasing the effectiveness of treatment, but also because it
widens the range of users who usefully might be treated to include
reluctant criminal offenders as well as those users who have simply
decided they have had enough. In many ways, coerced treatment
programs are superior to prisons and jails as a social response to
crime-committing drug users; they seem to provide significant crime
77. Id.
78. See Anglin & Hser, Treatment of Drug Abuse, in DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 22.
79. Id.
80. See Anglin, The Efficacy of Civil Commitment in Treating Narcotics Addiction, in COM-
PULSORY TREATMENT OF DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (Nat'l Inst. on
Drug Abuse Research Monograph 86, 1988).
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suppression results (to say nothing of other therapeutic benefits) at
lower economic costs.
8'
The evidence on prevention programs is much harder to come by.
It is true that society's attitudes are turning against cocaine, and that
this change follows a mass media campaign to alert people to the
hazards of the drug.82 But it is also true that society has been ac-
cumulating real, immediate experience with cocaine during the
same period. We have seen attitudes toward smoking change dra-
matically, and this holds out hope that society's ideas about other
drugs might change as it learns they are dangerous. 83 As noted
above, if history were to repeat itself, attitudes about cocaine use
would change as well. It is also clear, however, that society, and
individual drug users, pay an enormous price in learning about to-
bacco and cocaine the hard way. Prevention programs should try to
substitute for the hard learning that comes from widespread per-
sonal experiences.
With respect to the effectiveness of the more focused drug pre-
vention programs targeted at high risk youth, the jury is still out.
8 4
It seems that school based programs that focus intensively on teach-
ing resistance skills either alone or in combination with general life-
skills do delay the onset of drug use. 8 5 Achieving greater and more
durable preventive effects, however, appears to require programs
combining focused efforts on children with mass media appeals and
other measures that affect parents and other community institu-
tions.86 Apparently, the message must be communicated through
the broader environment as well as in one's individual life, and indi-
viduals must learn how to behave consistently with the message as
well as simply hear it.
The conclusion, then, is that there is room for optimism about
demand side approaches, but that they do not offer certain success
any more than do supply reduction approaches.
81. Id.
82. Changing Attitudes, supra note 26.
83. REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS,
supra note 68.
84. For an overview of the literature in this area, see Botvin, Substance Abuse Preven-
tion: Theory, Practice and Effectiveness, in DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 22. For some exper-
iments with prevention programs, see P. ELLICKSON, R. BELL, M. THOMAS, A. ROBYN &
G. ZELLMAN, DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING PROJECT ALERT: A SMOKING AND DRUG PRE-
VENTION EXPERIMENT (Rand Corp. Pub. No. R-3754-CHF, 1988); W. DEJONG, ARRESTING
THE DEMAND FOR DRUGS: POLICE AND SCHOOL PARTNERSHIPS TO PREVENT DRUG ABUSE
106-20 (Nat'l Inst. ofJust., Issues and Practices Series, 1987).
85. W. DEJONG, supra note 84, at 106-20.
86. Id. at 129-30.
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If one analyzes trends in federal spending for supply and demand
reduction over the last two decades, two facts stand out. First, over-
all spending has increased a great deal-by a factor of ten since
1972, and by a factor of forty since 1969!8 7 Second, the proportion
of spending devoted to treatment has declined dramatically, while
the proportions devoted to both supply reduction and preventive
education have increased dramatically. In fact, the fastest growing
component of federal drug abuse expenditures seems to be preven-
tive education.
To a degree, one can see these trends as an appropriate response
to the emerging cocaine epidemic. After all, when the epidemic is
rising, it is most important that future growth be dampened, and
both supply reduction efforts and drug education serve this func-
tion. Recognizing that society's current capacity to treat cocaine de-
pendence is quite limited makes the argument even stronger.88 In
theory, spending money on cocaine treatment is desirable; it is just
that existing programs have not been particularly effective.
Still, one has the distinct sense that current drug strategy under-
invests in treatment efforts. There are, by now, many casualties of
the epidemic who need even the limited help that can now be pro-
vided but cannot afford it. Furthermore, society urgently must ex-
periment with a wide variety of programs for treating cocaine use.
Society, then, should shift its response to the drug problem in the
direction of increased treatment. This need is made particularly ur-
gent by the threat that AIDS now poses to intravenous drug users.
To this extent, then, categorizing policy into supply and demand
reduction approaches is useful. But this categorization is also prob-
lematic. Instead of illuminating opportunities for effective joint ac-
tion, the categories seem to foster a polemical debate about which
approach should predominate. This debate, in turn, tends to ob-
scure the important and valuable interactions between supply re-
duction efforts and demand reduction efforts.
87. The principal references on which I am relying in making these estimates are the
following: STRATEGY COUNCIL ON DRUG ABUSE, FEDERAL STRATEGY FOR DRUG ABUSE AND
DRUG TRAFFIC PREVENTION-1975 (1975); STRATEGY COUNCIL ON DRUG ABUSE, FEDERAL
STRATEGY FOR DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFIC PREVENTION-1979 (1979); and OFF. OF
NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRAT-
EGY-1989 (1989).
88. For an overview of treatment effectiveness, see Kleber & Gawin, Cocaine Abuse: A
Review of Current and Experimental Treatments, in COCAINE: PHARMACOLOGY, EFFECTS, AND
TREATMENT OF ABUSE (Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse Research Monograph 50, 1984). For a
discussion of the opportunities for treating cocaine use, see Rawson, Cut the Crack: The
Policy'makers Guide to Cocaine Treatment, POL'Y REV., Winter 1990, at 10-19.
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For example, drug policy should concentrate on supply reduction
and drug law enforcement to create an environment in which it is
difficult and inconvenient for potential users to acquire drugs, and
in which life for experienced users is sufficiently uncomfortable that
they are motivated to seek treatment.8 9 In this way, supply reduc-
tion and law enforcement efforts support prevention and treatment
programs.
Another point: the drug laws are an important educational state-
ment that shapes the public's views of the various drugs. A law does
more than create a liability for criminal prosecution; it is a powerful
normative statement. 90 That statement may not be particularly in-
fluential to those who have already begun using drugs, or who de-
fine themselves in opposition to the broader society. Nonetheless,
for those who have not yet started using drugs, or for those who
have not settled into an oppositional stance, the fact that society has
legislated against some drugs may have a useful educational impact.
Finally, at local levels, in the cities where drug use is now produc-
ing devastating effects, the opportunity exists for communities to
combat drugs by combining law enforcement, preventive education,
and treatment. Law enforcement at street levels is needed to help
parents maintain control over the environments that their children
encounter, and to reinforce the message produced in educational
programs that drugs are dangerous, particularly for kids. Street
level law enforcement also helps to control drug related crime and
improve the condition of drug users by motivating the users directly
or indirectly to seek treatment. 9' Treatment programs are valuable
because they are more effective, less expensive, and more available
than jails in controlling crime and re-integrating offenders into the
community. The opportunity to recognize and exploit the synergy
of these approaches is obscured by a categorization that seems to
reflect the organization and responsibilities of the federal govern-
ment rather than the opportunities available to state and local
governments.
This categorization fosters a polemical debate because it is closely
tied to broader political outlooks. Generally speaking, conservatives
tend to favor law enforcement and supply reduction over demand
reduction and treatment. Liberals tend to prefer demand reduction
89. See DOMESTIC COUNCIL' DRUG ABUSE TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON DRUG ABUSE
2-4 (1975).
90. See M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 39-43 (1975).
91. See M. KLEIMAN, A. BARNETT, A. BOUZA & K. BURKE, STREET LEVEL DRUG EN-
FORCEMENT (Nat'l Inst. of Just. Issues and Practices Series, 1988).
Yale Law & Policy Review
and treatment. Such broad political views count heavily in deter-
mining policy positions-especially in a world where little reliable
information about effectiveness is available.
The categories of supply and demand reduction are also closely,
though not perfectly, aligned with professional interests. Supply re-
duction and law enforcement are often seen as the same thing since
it is assumed that enforcement efforts are properly directed at
sources of supply rather than users. These measures tend to attract
the support of police and criminal justice officials. Demand reduc-
tion and the social/medical approach are assumed to be equivalent
because they do not appear to rely on the coercive power of the
state, and use volunteers, parents, and physicians more than en-
forcement personnel. Quite naturally, they attract the support of
physicians and public health personnel. This alignment with profes-
sional interests tends to harden divisions in the war against drugs.
Insofar as the categorization of supply and demand reduction ef-
forts provides a way to track federal priorities, it is a useful analytic
device. Insofar as it fosters a continuing political stalemate, or di-
vides the institutions that must deal with the problem, however, the
categorization stands in the way of effective governmental action.
We must keep clearly in mind that the war on drugs is being fought
block by block in cities. We must defend those blocks by establish-
ing effective working partnerships among parents, schools, police,
courts and treatment agencies at local levels. That requires us to
understand the complementary nature of supply and demand reduc-
tion strategies.
IV Groping Toward an Effective Drug Policy
With respect to drugs, society is now trying to do two difficult
tasks simultaneously. It is mobilizing itself to take action against an
urgent problem that is probably going to get worse before it gets
better, but that would respond to prompt and effective action with
substantial long term rewards for the society. As it takes action,
however, it is searching for more certain and effective ways of re-
sponding to the problem.
This is not unusual, of course. Society often must simultaneously
act to confront urgent social problems even as it develops the per-
spective and knowledge that it needs to address the problems effec-
tively. Problems come upon us unannounced; not everything can be
predicted or prepared for.
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Moreover, it is not particularly bad that these things occur simul-
taneously. Necessity does produce inventions. The inventions, if
reviewed and analyzed, provide an experiential basis for important
social learning.
Unfortunately, our opportunities for learning are usually squan-
dered because the forms of discourse appropriate to mobilization
for action are inconsistent with the forms that are appropriate for
learning. Mobilizing society to take action seems to require a lan-
guage of urgency about the problem and certainty about the solu-
tions. Building commitment to the cause seems to require certainty
about the direction. On the other hand, the forms of discourse that
are appropriate for learning often seem inconsistent with the re-
quirements for action. The social scientists who seek to develop so-
ciety's perspective on social problems, and organize its learning
about what works and what does not, often establish a discourse that
seems to require that the world stand still, and that first premises be
re-examined before any action is taken. Otherwise, any intellectual
inquiry is tainted by the rude requirements of the practical world,
and is not to be trusted.
The challenge before society is to see whether it can forge a form
of discourse that allows society to learn and adapt even as it acts
aggressively to deal with the urgent task of limiting the cocaine epi-
demic, and with the longer term problem of reducing the endemic
social consequences of using heroin, marijuana, alcohol and to-
bacco. There is much need for more disciplined thought and fact
gathering as society confronts these problems. In this dialogue, the
question of the proper legal regime has a place. But it would be
unwise to waste all our intellectual and political capacity for debate
on this question. There are many other important questions, such
as the proper role of community self-defense against drug use, the
best form of treatment for cocaine use, and whether coerced treat-
ment programs are more or less successful than jails in controlling
crime in the short run, and rehabilitating users in the long run.
The question remains: will we be able to create the institutional
forms in which that intellectual work can be done even as we are
trying to mobilize the society to act? It is an urgent question, for
unless we succeed in this, we will be flying blind in fighting the war
against drugs, and failing to learn from our accumulating
experience.
